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Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple equilibria, a 
fact that is usually ignored in macroeconomic models. Our basic argument is that default and 
bankruptcy laws are required to prevent strategic default, and these laws can also serve to 
provide the conditions for uniqueness. In this paper we report experimental evidence on the 
effectiveness of this approach to resolving multiplicity: society can assign default penalties 
on fiat money so the economy selects one of the equilibria. Our data show that the choice of 
default penalty takes the economy to the neighborhood of the chosen equilibrium. The theory 
and evidence together reinforce the idea that accounting, bankruptcy and possibly other 
aspects of social mechanisms play an important role in resolving the otherwise 
mathematically intractable challenges associated with multiplicity of equilibria in closed 
economies. Additionally we discuss the meaning and experimental implications of default 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple 
equilibria. In spite of its importance for policy decisions, questions about this multiplicity are 
often set aside in dynamic models of the macro-economy. While learning theories and 
experimental gaming have attempted to address the problem of equilibrium selection, in 
mathematical general equilibrium theory how equilibria are selected in presence of 
multiplicity remains an interesting but unresolved challenge. This paper is an attempt to 
understand the role of financial institutions, such as bankruptcy laws and accounting rules, in 
dynamically resolving the multiplicity problems in closed economies. To this end, we 
conduct a laboratory experiment and report evidence that through choice of a default 
(bankruptcy) penalty, the outcome of a closed economy can be directed to any targeted 
element in the set of its equilibria. 
  In attempting to construct a process model of a general equilibrium system as a 
playable game, if any form of borrowing whatsoever is present it is necessary to introduce 
default penalties to prevent strategic bankruptcy; but the bankruptcy conditions may also 
provide a way to select among multiple equilibria if they are present. In the static models of 
general equilibrium theory there is no “nice” general condition that selects a unique 
equilibrium in an economy with only the usual restrictions on smooth concave utility 
functions. 
  The following five mathematically describable conditions (all highly restrictive) are 
known to be sufficient for the existence of a single competitive equilibrium in a closed 
exchange economy with n agents and m commodities:  
1.  There is a single agent (n = 1). Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  3
2.  There is a single commodity (m = 1). 
3.  All individuals have the same utility function. 
4.  There is gross substitutability among all goods. 
5.  There exists a commodity that is in positive supply that is desired by all and 
whose worth enters into the utility functions of all as a linear separable term. 
Here we explore the fifth condition, and more specifically the role of institutional 
constraints like default penalties as instruments of equilibrium selection. Qin and Shubik 
(2008) suggest that penalty conditions are reasonable when one attempts to convert a general 
equilibrium structure into a playable game. They demonstrate that trading in markets with a 
fiat money and default penalties is a sufficient way to construct a process model that selects 
among multiple equilibrium points. In a dynamic model of an economy where individuals are 
strategically free to borrow, well-defined rules and penalties on default are a logical 
necessity. They are also an institutional fact in every economy (see Karatzas, Shubik, 
Sudderth and Geanakoplos, 2006). 
In this paper we experimentally examine the possibility to engineer the outcome of a 
three-equilibrium exchange economy (constructed by Shapley and Shubik, 1977
2) through 
the choice of financial institutions in the form of the default penalty regime. The selection of 
penalties or a value for a government money is equivalent to the fifth condition listed above. 
We find that the assignment of a proper value to a fiat money (which can be interpreted as a 
default penalty when net money holding is negative) yields laboratory outcomes in proximity 
to a predictable unique equilibrium. 
                                                 
2 The Shapley and Shubik (1977) example has been generalized by Bergstrom, Shimomura and Yamato (2008) 
so that many other examples of economies with three equilibria can easily be generated. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  4
In contrast with the important goals of macroeconomic applications approached from 
the “top down,” in this paper we are concerned with a “bottoms up” approach in utilizing a 
microeconomic approach to studying market economies. Building rigorous foundations of 
macroeconomics calls for the static general equilibrium models to be integrated with general 
process models. Strategic market games help us achieve this goal because setting them up 
forces us to specify complete and consistent process models. By their very nature they are 
amenable to examination by both mathematical analysis and experimental gaming. 
Selection of a single equilibrium from a set of equilibria raises another question: is 
there any societal reason to favor a specific equilibrium over the others? One reasonable 
condition is to select the equilibrium which calls for the minimum cash flow.  Any process 
model that is a playable game must specify how trade takes place and thus provides the 
conditions to be able to calculate the cash flows. By selecting the equilibrium that requires 
the least amount of money, society would economize on the use of “trust pills” as individual 
trust is a prerequisite for acceptability of fiat money. As a New England saying puts it: “In 
God we trust, all others pay cash.” 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the Qin and Shubik (2008) 
economy with multiple equilibria; Section 3 describes three variations of the economy as 
playable games and presents testable hypotheses; Section 5 presents the results followed by 
conclusions in Section 6. 
2. AN ECONOMY WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA 
  In this paper we examine the outcomes of an economy with two commodities and two 
types of traders modeled as a strategic market game with three competitive equilibrium 
points, one of which is unstable under Walrasian dynamics. Consider the model graphically Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  5
illustrated in Figure 1. It displays an exchange economy with three competitive equilibria in 
an Edgeworth Box. The initial endowment (x, y) of each trader of Type 1 is (40,0) and the 
initial endowment of each trader of Type 2 is (0,50). The utility functions of the individuals 
are, respectively, 
) 1 ( 100 ) , (
10 /
1
y e x y x U
− − + =  and 
) 1 ( 110 ) , (
10 /
2
x e y y x U
− − + = . 
  The initial endowment point is the upper left of the box with coordinates (40,0) and 
(0,50). The dotted lines represent the minimal individually rational indifference curves going 
through the initial endowment point. The Pareto optimal set of outcomes is given by C1D1V 
C2D2. The two curves that intersect three times on the Pareto Set are the response curves for 
each trader, calculated by varying price and asking each trader how much she would be 
willing to trade at each price. Supply equals demand only at the points of intersection of the 
two curves as is indicated by the three equilibria. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
With only one trader on each side it can be regarded as a model of barter. With n 
traders on each side it provides the simplest model of an economy where a market price can 
be formed by aggregating many bids and offers. Here the same figure can be regarded as 
representing type symmetric trade outcomes in a market with n players on each side.
3 
Ordinary individuals rarely make conscious economic decisions at a global level. 
Therefore, for understanding and analyzing an economy populated by agents whose behavior 
is mostly local, it is possible that the multiple equilibria obtained from global optimization in 
a formal mathematical model may be misleading or irrelevant. Moreover virtually all 
                                                 
3 Type symmetry means that all traders of the same type take the same action. Thus, instead of needing a 
diagram in 2n dimensions the 2-dimensional diagram is sufficient. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  6
experimental gaming has been conducted with open or partial equilibrium systems and we 
cannot assume that those results necessarily generalize to closed systems. On the other hand, 
global optima may form domains of attraction even in environments dominated by local 
behavior (e.g., Gode and Sunder, 1993). Whether this is the case remains an empirical 
question on which the present exploration can be expected to shed some light. 
3.  THE GAME AND ITS MODIFICATIONS 
We consider a simple game with two subject types with endowments of (40,0) and 
(0,50) of goods (A,B). All subjects know their initial endowments and the earnings functions, 
and bid and offer some of their endowments for exchange. We conduct three experimental 
treatments, the first to establish control about the behavior of the economy in presence of 
multiple equilibria and about the irrelevance of the choice of numeraire in a pure exchange 
economy
4. The second treatment is to verify whether the choice of different levels of the 
default penalty leads to the respective desired equilibrium, and the third treatment is to 
explore whether any desired point on the contract curve can be approached. Each treatment 
has two or more sub-treatments. Unlike the three CEs where trades always balance in value 
and can be illustrated by points on the Pareto surface in two dimensions, the equilibrium for 
the third case is a point in three dimensions showing the change in money holdings.  
In the first treatment the goods are traded in a pure exchange economy consisting of a 
single market without money. In Treatment 2 a money is introduced to facilitate trade in two 
markets (one for each commodity) and we reparametrize this multiple equilibrium economy 
by changing the default penalty/value of money so that each of the three equilibria, in turn, 
becomes the unique competitive equilibrium (see Qin and Shubik, 2008). Finally, in 
                                                 
4 In economics the selection of a numeraire is a far less innocent an assumption than is usually thought (see 
Smith and Shubik, 2005 and Shubik and Smith, 2007 for a discussion). Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  7
Treatment 3 the default penalties are set so that the unique equilibrium coincides with none 
of the conventional CEs, where the budgets balance for every agent, but with an equilibrium 
point with active bankruptcy that we call “an active bankruptcy modified general 
equilibrium.”
5 
3.1.  Treatment 1 (T1a, T1b): One market to exchange two goods 
A commodity money has the property that it can be used to facilitate exchange in 
every market. In treatment T1 the decision by a player of type 1 is to bid a quantity of good 
A to buy good B at an exchange ration (price) to be determined by the market, while type 2 
player offers an amount of good B for sale in exchange for good A at the same to-be-
determined-in-the-market price. When there are only two goods and only one market either 
can serve as a money, as one can define price in terms of either. Price can be regarded as 
either the number of units of good A that can be exchanged for one unit of good B, or 
number of units of good B that can be exchanged for one unit of good A. In the first instance 
A serves as the numeraire or money, in the second instance B is the numeraire. To explore 
whether the selection of the numeraire influences market outcomes we conduct two sub-
treatments: good A is the numeraire in treatment T1a, and Good B serves that function in 
treatment T1b. Holdings of goods are carried over from one period to the next. The game 
ends when total trading volume for either of the two commodities falls below a negligibly 
small level (arbitrarily set at 0.2 units) in a period, i.e., when no trader wishes to further 
change his/her position and trading almost stops.  
                                                 
5 Technically this is a noncooperative equilibrium that only coincides with the conventional general equilibrium 
when there is a continuum of agents and the penalties are set so that no one chooses strategic bankruptcy. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  8
Subjects are provided with a 51 x 51 (range 0-50 and 0-50) payoff matrix that 
portrays the final earnings space (see Appendix A for condensed versions). In addition they 
receive the explicit formulae for the payoffs, which are: 
       ) 1 ( 100 ) , (
10 /
1
y e x y x U
− − + = , and 
) 1 ( 110 ) , (
10 /
2
x e y y x U
− − + = . 
where x and y are the quantities of goods A and B held by subjects.  
In theory, which of the two commodities is regarded as a money should make no 
difference to outcomes of the economy. In treatment T1 we explore whether this holds in the 
lab. Furthermore, of the three equilibrium points the middle one is unstable under Walrasian 
dynamics, but stable under the dynamics in the strategic market game participants play in the 
lab sessions. Experimental literature frequently reports a tendency towards middle (or 
average) outcomes (Spear, Gode and Sunder, 2004), which could also play a role here.  
There is no generally agreed upon learning theory for such a situation. Without 
specifying the dynamics, several conjectures are possible, including convergence toward one 
of the equilibrium points predicted by the static theory. In the single-market models, since we 
use the buy-sell mechanism,
6 the dynamics is neither price adjustment (Walrasian) nor 
quantity adjustment (Marshallian) alone. Kumar and Shubik (2004) point out that its 
dynamics includes elements of both, and has distinct stability properties. They have noted 
many variants of convergence beyond either Walrasian or Marshallian adjustment.  
Conjecture 1: In Treatment 1 the process fails to converge to any of the three equilibria.  
                                                 
6 If A is regarded as the money we may say the traders of Type 1 bid money and Type 2 offer goods, hence 
“bid-offer”. If B is regarded as the money it is vice-versa. For an examination of buy-sell and two other minimal 
market mechanisms, see Huber et al. (2009). Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  9
Although we can mathematically describe the full state space and calculate the equilibria, we 
are not able to, from the theory, to select a single equilibrium when there are only two 
commodities. 
Conjecture 2   In Treatment 1 the middle CE is favored. 
Walrasian stability considerations do not favor the middle equilibrium point, but it is reached 
by trading similar amounts of goods 1 and 2 for each other and we thus conjecture that this 
may be the market outcome.  
Conjecture 3   In Treatment 1 the choice of the medium of exchange or numeraire does not 
influence the outcomes (prices and distribution of goods). 
At this level of abstraction when only two consumable non-durable commodities are present 
there are no obvious micro-variables such as durability, portability, weight, etc. present that 
favor one good over the other as the medium of exchange. 
We ran T1a and T1b with two cohorts of 10 student subjects each. Each cohort played 
two runs, i.e., after the first run, a second run was played. The only difference between the 
runs was that the initial endowments of subjects were reversed, i.e., those endowed with 
(40,0) in the first run had (0,50) in the second run and vice versa. The notation is run 1-1 for 
the first run of cohort 1 and run 1-2 for the second run of this cohort (and 2-1 and 2-2 for the 
second cohort).  
3.2. Treatment 2 (T2a, T2b, T2c, T2a-R, T2b-R, T2c-R): Two Markets and Varied 
Marginal Value of Money   Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  10
In Treatment 2 a linearly separable money M is introduced in addition to goods A and 
B, and the utility functions are modified by adding a monetary good z with constant marginal 
utility normalized to one:
7 
) 1 ( 100 ) , , (
10 /
1 1
y e x z z y x U
− − + + = μ  and 
) 1 ( 110 ) , , (
10 /
2 2
x e y z z y x U
− − + + = μ   
where the μ’s are parameters and the initial endowments now include an amount of money. 
This amount equals or exceeds the transactions amount needed at any one of the CEs. This 
change, i.e., the introduction of money with a positive value (default penalty when net money 
holdings are negative) leads to a new unique equilibrium. The location of this equilibrium 
depends on the two μ’s. For interpretation of the parameters μ1 and μ2 note that in an 
exchange economy with a fiat money there are two quite different forces that support the 
valuation of the fiat. The first is expectations of the future worth of money in exchange, 
which is essentially dynamic (see Bak, Norrellyke and Shubik, 1999). The second involves 
the magnitude of the penalties imposed by a society on individuals who default on their 
debts. In equilibrium in a society that uses a fiat, money must have the marginal utility of a 
unit of income equal at least to the marginal disutility of ending with a unit of debt.  
Although it appears that we have introduced a linear separable money that could be 
regarded as some form of commodity money with value, it is a zero-interest loan by the 
government that must be redeemed at the end of the game. A penalty is assigned against 
those who fail to return their full original loan, and a reward is given to those who return 
                                                 
7 In order to make a meaningful comparison between any equilibria we need to normalize the economies so that 
the value of the total amount of goods in the economy is the same amount, W, under all equilibrium prices.  Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  11
more. The positive bonus may be regarded as reflecting the expectation that the future 
valuation of a paper money would maintain its marginal utility.
8  
  We may rewrite the utility functions in the form: 
)) 1 ( 100 (
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.  
If the marginal disutility of debt is less than the marginal utility of income, it would pay 
individuals to borrow more and to default. If it is greater than or equal to the marginal utility 
of income it does not pay to default. In this experiment, we set the terminal value of money 
(which represents expectations) and the default parameter to be equal, i.e., subjects earn 
points for positive money holdings and get points deducted for negative money holdings. 
In this economy subjects trade in two markets (one each for goods A and B) for 
money. The trader strategy has two dimensions, with type 1 offering a quantity of good A for 
sale and bidding a quantity of fiat money to buy good B (and vice-versa for traders of type 
2). The introduction of fiat money with the parameters μi is enough to guarantee a unique 
competitive equilibrium point for non-zero amounts of money (see Qin and Shubik 2008). 
While μ1 is always set to 1, μ2 is varied in three sub-treatments to attain the three 
equilibrium points.
9 Specifically, in treatments T2a, T2b, and T2c, we set μ2 = 0.28, 0.75, and 
5.07, respectively, since these values correspond to the marginal value of income
10 at the 
                                                 
8 There are two ways to model the return to the individuals with extra fiat money: give them no terminal payoff 
or give them a payoff that can be interpreted as the expected future value of money. We choose the latter 
because it is more consistent with the infinite horizon models; the former is well defined but only consistent 
with the proposition that the asset fiat money has no value if there are no further transactions. 
9 With the same bankruptcy laws applicable to all, how could the penalties differ across traders? As 
demonstrated by the bankruptcies of General Motors and Chrysler in Spring 2009, default penalties are tailored 
by the legal process yielding very different opportunity costs for different agents.  
10 A default penalty needs to be at least this strong to discourage default. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  12
three competitive equilibria of the economy, and examine the effect of this variation in μ2 on 
outcomes of the economy.
11 
To assure comparability with the results from T1 we first conduct one run each for 
T2a, T2b, and T2c. However, learning possibilities are limited in these treatments, as 
holdings of goods are not reinitialized. Even in a static theory this makes a difference. If we 
reinitialize the holdings, traders have the opportunity to learn costlessly. Reinitialization 
clearly makes learning easier, as different strategies can be tried and individual decisions can 
be improved. In the other instance, i.e., when holdings of goods are carried over, a subject 
does not have the opportunity to recover from poor decisions made in the past. In particular, 
as the competitive equilibrium moves with each change in endowment point the no-
reinitialization process is stacked against going to the initial CE. To account for this, and to 
observe whether learning takes place, we conducted two runs for each of three sub-treatments 
T2a-R, T2b-R, and T2c-R (where “R” standing for reinitialization with 15 independent 
periods in each run (starting with endowments of 40/0/100 or 0/50/100 of A/B/money);  the 
sum of all period earnings determined the final payout in dollars.  
Conjecture 4   In Treatment 2 the system converges and can be made to converge to any of 
the three equilibria guided by the selection of parameter μ.
12 
In Treatment 2 there is an ideal money with linear transferable utility. Where the 
parameters μ come from has to be explained. In the structure here it is the expected value of 
money at the end of the game fixed by the experimenter. In the theory it can be interpreted as 
                                                 
11 Multiple equilibria are rare in general as was shown by Debreu. For this example Kumar and Shubik (2003) 
performed a sensitivity analysis to show precisely the somewhat narrow range of changes in the distribution of 
endowments of the two player types that would preserve the property of multiple equilibria. In other words a 
slight redistribution of resources given to a trader (more of one commodity and less of the other) will produce 
an economy with one equilibrium unless the redistribution is within an appropriately narrow range, 
12 If the μ (μ1, μ2) are not selected to coincide with the Lagrangians the books are balanced by a transfer of 
money as is shown in the third treatment. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  13
expectations, or (when borrowing is permitted and thus negative holdings are possible) it can 
be interpreted as default parameters set by a society. In either instance, if these parameters 
are under the control of the society (or experimenter in the game) and there is a setting 
associated with each of the three equilibria, the parameters may be selected in a way that 
fixes the value of money associated with one of the equilibria. 
As the money is a linear term, equilibrium can be reached with any net money 
holdings, depending on how prices evolve. We conjecture that subjects with relatively high 
marginal utility for good holdings (i.e., those endowed with good B in T3a and those 
endowed with goods A in T3c) will be ready to incur negative net money holdings (i.e., 
spend more than they earn), while those with low marginal value of goods (and thus 
relatively high value for money) will hold on to money and thus end with positive net money 
holdings. However the theoretical possibility of zero net money holdings should occur for 
penalties set appropriately for any one of the three CEs.  Thus for them the null hypothesis is.  
Conjecture 5   In Treatment 2 net money holdings will beequal to the equilibrium level of 
zero.  
We have six sub-treatments to T2. Each of T2a, T2b, and T2c is run with one cohort 
of 10 students each and trading ends once trading volume drops to a negligible amount. Each 
of the three sub-treatments T2a-R, T2b-R, and T2c-R is run with two cohorts of 10 students 
each that played a predetermined number (15) of independent periods. No subject 
participated in more than one of the sub-treatments.  
3.3. Treatment 3 (T3, T3-R): Two Markets with Money 
In Section 3.2 it was suggested that by the appropriate selection of parameters μ1 and 
μ2 the economy could be guided to select any one of the three equilibrium points. A question Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  14
not addressed was what happens if the parameters selected do not coincide with the marginal 
values of income at any of the three equilibria?  
An equilibrium will exist for any parameter selected but it will not be one of the three 
CEs of the original economy. Any sufficiently large selection of penalty which is different 
from the CE penalties will lead to a unique equilibrium with a net transfer of money from 
one class of agents to the other.
13 We examine this possibility in T3 where we purposely set 
μ1 = μ2 = 1 in order to consider a case where the solution should be a unique equilibrium with 
allocations different from all three equilibria in the original model (Treatment 1). When both 
μ’s are set to 1 the unique equilibrium coincides with the joint maximum, i.e., the point 
where the sum of the earnings of the two trader types is maximized.  
The formal mathematical theory of general equilibrium has no money and no errors. 
It does not provide a process structure. Here money plays a critical role in formulating the 
dynamic structure of an economy. The value of supply does not need to equal the value of 
demand. The difference is covered by a net transfer of money.   
One might ask why bother with penalty levels other than those that support equilibria.  
One reason is to stress our concern with the role of rules and institutions in the economy. We 
believe that the government has only general knowledge about the preferences and assets in 
the economy which is normally insufficient accurately to guess a penalty level that would 
support one of multiple equilibria. If it guesses incorrectly the number of bankruptcies would 
signal that it needs to adjust the penalties. This could be tested experimentally by having the 
                                                 
13 Thus, for a complete representation we would need a three-dimensional diagram. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  15
government as a player trying to select an appropriate penalty but having some uncertainty 
concerning endowments and preferences.
14 
Conjecture 6   In Treatment 3 the unique equilibrium defined by the default penalties μ1 and 
μ2 is approached. 
We conduct one sub-treatment where holdings of goods are carried over (T3) and one where 
holdings are reinitialized after each period (T3-R). Two runs with one cohort of 10 subjects 
are conducted for T3 and one run for T3-R. All experiments were carried out using a 
program written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and average payment was 20 dollar for each 
subject in each of the approximately 60-minute sessions. All subjects were undergraduate 
business or economics students. About half of the runs were conducted at Yale University, 
while the other runs were conducted at the University of Innsbruck.  
4.  RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTS 
For our three treatments we conducted ten sub-treatments (T1a, T1b, T2a, T2b, T2c, 
T2a-R, T2b-R, T2c-R, T3, T3-R) with a total of 20 runs. Each run was conducted with 10 
subjects for a total of 200 subjects. In all treatments five subjects started with an endowment 
of 40/0 while the other five started with 0/50 of goods A/B. There was no money in 
Treatment 1. The money endowment was 100 units per trader in Treatments 2 and 3.  
4.1. Treatment 1 
In Treatment 1 goods A and B are traded for each other. Holdings of goods are 
carried over from one period to the next and there is no money. Good A serves as the unit of 
                                                 
14 When there is no exogenous uncertainty active bankruptcy is caused by inappropriate penalties or human 
error. In an economy with exogenous uncertainty an optimal bankruptcy law can only be reflected by taking 
into account society’s attitude towards risk. It is a form of public good; and even without human error it will 
involve active bankruptcy. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  16
accounting in T1a and good B is the numeraire in T1b. Trading stops when total offered 
volume in either of the two goods is below 0.2 units in a period.  
The four panels of Figure 2 present the Edgeworth boxes of the holdings of goods A 
and B in the four runs of T1a where A is the numeraire. The black squares mark the three 
equilibrium points and the dashed line is the contract curve. The grey triangles mark the joint 
maximum earnings, i.e., the point where the sum of the earnings of both trader types 
combined is maximized. The small circles show individual holdings of goods at the end of a 
period and the black line with black diamonds show the development of average holdings of 
goods over periods (each diamond shows the holdings at the end of a period). Two panels on 
the left show the first run of a subject cohort, while the panels on the right show the 
respective second run. We observe that three of the four runs end in the vicinity of the 
contract curve. Of the three equilibria and the joint maximum, the end points of all four runs 
are closest to the joint maximum. Of the three equilibria, the end points are closest to the 
middle equilibrium in three runs and about midway between the middle and the lower left 
equilibrium in one run. On the whole, neither the joint maximum nor any of the three 
equilibria are a compelling candidate to serve as domains of attraction for these economies.
15 
Rather a vague “trend to the middle” seems to drive the results. This confirms Conjecture 1 
(no approach to an equilibrium) and rejects Conjecture 2 (approach to middle equilibrium) 
for T1a. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
Figure 3 presents the same data for Treatment 1b. Recall that this treatment is 
identical to Treatment 1a with the only exception that good B is the numeraire. We see in 
Figure 3 that – as predicted by theory – this does not change results significantly. Two of the 
                                                 
15 For a detailed discussion of stability see Kumar and Shubik 2004. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  17
four economies come close to the joint maximum, but none of the three equilibria serve as a 
strong domain of attraction for these economies. Even the middle equilibrium does not do 
very well in spite of the fact that in the presence of three equilibrium predictions, the middle 
point has a statistical advantage of the two extremes in being closer to the observed data. 
Again Conjecture 1 is confirmed while Conjecture 2 is rejected. 
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
Does the choice of the numeraire make a difference for the outcome of the 
experiment? In a first test we use a Mann-Whitney U-test to compare final holdings of good 
A between the four runs of T1a and the four runs of T1b. The same is repeated for the final 
holdings of good B. We do not find any significant differences, as the p-values are 0.2 or 
higher (N = 40). This observation confirms Conjecture 3 that the choice of numeraire does 
not significantly affect the market outcome. 
A key question in considering any market mechanism is whether the outcome is 
efficient. Here we define efficiency as the sum of all subjects’ earnings as a percentage of the 
maximum earnings achievable, i.e., this maximum is 100 percent in each treatment.
16 Figure 
4 presents the time series of trading volume and efficiency in Treatment 1. The four panels 
on the top and in the middle rows present the development of cumulative trading volume 
(Good A in the top row, Good B in the middle row; Good A as numeraire on the left, and 
Good B as numeraire on the right panels). Cumulative trading volume generally approaches 
the joint maximum prediction (dark continuous line) and the experienced subject economies 
(shaded graey) are generally closer to the joint maximum than the inexperienced subject 
                                                 
16 Note that the specific numbers of these maximum earnings are equal in T1a and T1b, but otherwise vary from 
sub-treatment to sub-treatment, as μ is varied. Actually, in T1 any point on the Pareto surface could be regarded 
efficient, but for simple two-dimensional graphing as an approximation we utilize the joint maximum, i.e. the 
point were the sum of the earnings of both trader types is maximized.  Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  18
economics. Each subject has only the option to sell units of the good she is initially endowed 
with; cumulative trading volume series are concave because trading volume declines as 
subjects approach their desired portfolio of goods.  
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the development of efficiency in T1. With lower 
trading volume in the second runs, efficiency also increases more slowly. On average the 
same level of efficiency is reached in the first and the second runs (96.1 vs. 96.8 percent; the 
difference is statistically insignificant). Overall we find that efficiency reaches high levels 
and trading in all runs stopped either in the period with the highest efficiency, or one period 
after the maximum was reached. 
  Summing up, in Treatment 1 we find that it does not matter which of the two goods in 
this exchange economy is chosen as the numeraire. Efficiency in all markets is high, 
demonstrating that such simple markets serve well as coordination mechanisms.   
4.2. Treatment 2 
In Treatment 2, the salvage value of money (default penalty when negative) is varied 
(μ2 = 0.28, 0.75, and 5.07) to reach the three separate equilibria in T2a, T2b, and T2c, 
respectively. We conduct one run each for T2a, T2b and T2c, where holdings of goods and 
money are carried over from one period. Each run was conducted with a different cohort of 
ten students each.    
To allow learning and observe possible learning effects we then implemented three 
other sub-treatments, where holdings of goods are re-initialized after each period (μ2 is varied 
again with values 0.28, 0.75, and 5.07). Thus, subjects start each period with 40/0/100 or 
0/50/100 of goods A/B and money, and they have only one transaction to reach their desired Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  19
holdings of the goods and money. As holdings are re-initialized we label these sub-treatments 
“R” and thus refer to them as T2a-R, T2b-R, and T2c-R. We conduct two runs for each of the 
three sub-treatments for a total of six runs, each with a different cohort of students. 15 
independent periods are conducted for each of the runs. No student participated in more than 
one run presented in this paper. 
  Figure 5 presents the development of individual and average end-of-period holdings 
of goods A and B for T2a (left panel), T2b (center), and T2c (right panel). We still show all 
three competitive equilibria of the economy, however, by defining the salvage value of 
money there is a unique equilibrium in each sub-treatment. This unique equilibrium is shown 
as a black square, while we still display the former equilibria in white squares and the former 
joint maximum (white triangle) for the sake of easier comparison across treatments. The 
paths in the three sub-treatments are distinct from each other, and each path approaches the 
vicinity of its respective equilibrium (and away from the other two equilibria). To test 
whether manipulation of salvage values/default penalties for money (parameter μ2) can select 
different equilibria as claimed in Conjecture 4, we use Mann-Whitney U-tests comparing the 
ending holdings of good A for T2a with those of T2b, T2a vs. T2c, and T2b vs. T2c. This is 
repeated for good B. All six tests produce p-values smaller than 0.05, and Conjecture 4 on 
the choice of default penalty causing the economy to converge to the corresponding 
equilibrium is not rejected. 
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
  The three sub-treatments differ with respect to the trading volume required to reach 
the respective equilibrium. In T2a (μ2 = 0.28), which holdings of goods relatively more 
valuable for traders endowed with good B, those endowed with A should sell most of their Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  20
holdings of A to the other traders, while those endowed with B should hold on to most of 
their goods. To reach equilibrium each A-holder should sell 36.78 of his 40 units of A, while 
each B-holder should sell only 10.23 of his 50 units of B. To provide more dynamic 
information the development of cumulative market trading volume per period is displayed in 
Figure 6 (market volumes should be five times the per capita trades given above). We see in 
each market the expected pattern of relatively high trading volume in the beginning and a 
subsequent drop in trading volume until trading stops between period 9 and 12 (as volume in 
one good drops below 0.2). We also see that the predicted market volumes provide some 
support for the observed market volumes in all three sub-treatments in the three panels of 
Figure 6. As predicted by theory in T2a, trading in A is more active than in B, while the 
opposite holds in T2c (in T2b the volumes are balanced, as predicted by theory). 
 (Insert Figure 6 about here) 
  We do not display the development of efficiency in a separate figure, as the results 
are very similar to those observed in T1: efficiency increases over time and trading stops in 
the period with the highest overall efficiency or one period later. The efficiency levels 
reached are 98.2, 98.2, and 95.6 percent, respectively, in T2a, T2b, and T2c. 
Treatment 2-R (holdings of goods and money re-initialized) 
  We now turn to the three sub-treatments where holdings of goods and money are re-
initialized after each period. Two runs were conducted for each sub-treatment. Figure 7 
displays period-by-period holdings of goods A and B in T2a-R, T2b-R, and T2c-R (with the 
final period shaded in grey). The lines allow us to follow the outcome of trading, i.e., the 
average end-of-period holdings over the sequence of periods. The left panel shows first run 
for each of the three sub-treatments, and the right panels presents the second. All six runs Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  21
were conducted with different subjects. The paths in the three sub-treatments are quite 
distinct from one another, and each run approaches its respective equilibrium over time.
17 
The T2b-R and T2c-R equilibria are essentially reached in the second period, while in T2a-R 
it took a few periods longer to approach the equilibrium. This demonstrates that the selection 
of the default penalty is suitable to select among the multiple equilibria, thus corroborating 
the result from T2 that Conjecture 4 is not rejected. 
(Insert Figure 7 about here) 
In all three sub-treatments the largest gain in efficiency occurred during the first 
period, moving from autarky to the market economy. As can be seen in Figure 8 this is 
followed by smaller increases in efficiency over subsequent periods (period 0 is efficiency 
associated with autarky and 100 percent is the efficiency of the respective competitive 
equilibria). The parameter μ2 played a major role in the achievement of efficiency.  In T2a-R 
(μ2 = 0.28) it took 10 (4) periods for efficiency to reach 90% in the first (second) run. T2b-R 
and T2c-R (μ2 = 0.75 and 5.07, respectively) reached high efficiency levels of more than 90% 
already during the very first period.  
(Insert Figure 8 about here) 
These results of T2 and T2-R broadly confirm the results from T1—the introduction 
of a money allows convergence to the unique equilibrium that is defined by the value/default 
penalty associated with the money.  
 
                                                 
17 Note that each diamond marker in Figure 7 shows the holding achieved in a period starting every period with 
the endowment point in the northwest corner. We have joined the diamond markers with a line to indicate the 
sequence of periods in order to point out that the outcomes got generally closer to the respective equilibrium 
holders in the later periods of the runs. In contrast, in the treatments without re-initialization, the northwest 
corner was the endowment point only at the beginning of period 1, and the change in holdings in all 
subsequence periods was incremental relative to the end of the preceding period.  Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  22
Net Money Holdings  
In the sub-treatments of T2 and T2-R the respective equilibrium can be reached with 
net money holdings of all traders at zero or at any other desired level, as money holdings are 
a result of prices which are set endogenously by traders’ bids and offers. Net money holdings 
of zero are achieved when the ratio between the prices of the two goods is equal to the 
respective μ2.
18 However, this would lead to a very uneven distribution of final points earned, 
e.g., in T2c (and T2c-R) with μ2 = 5.07 subjects starting with good B would have to buy 7.74 
units of good A at a price five times higher than the price they get for each of the 39.26 units 
of B they sell in equilibrium. They would end up with relatively small holdings of the goods 
and thus earn only 10 percent of the points that A-holders earn.  
Figure 9 presents the development of net money holdings over time in all six sub-
treatments (the runs of T2a (and T2a-R) are in the left panel, T2b is in the center and T2c on 
the right). The panels also show the GE holdings (always zero). We see that the GE-
proposition does not serve as a good benchmark in most of the runs, as net money holdings 
are never zero and mostly move away from zero over time. Only in T2b do net money 
holdings remain relatively close to zero. Net money holdings of subjects in the last period are 
significantly different from zero in eight of the nine runs of T2 (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U-
Tests, N=5 for each test, the only insignificant result is T2b). Thus Conjecture 5 is rejected. 
(Insert Figure 9 about here) 
Conjecture 5, while consistent with the theory leave out both the imperfections of 
learning and error to be expected in even as simple an environment as this. Furthermore, the 
perceived extreme nonsymmetry of the three CEs  is such that we might expect a deviation 
from the balanced budget condition to be present, especially for the two extreme equilibria.  
                                                 
18 Recall that μ1 = 1 in all treatments. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  23
Further experimentation is called for to resolve the attribution of the sources of lack of a 
balanced budget. 
4.3. Treatment 3 
In Section 4.2 we have demonstrated that varying the default penalty can bring the 
economy close to the selected one of the three equilibria of the original model. A question 
that is not yet answered is: what would happen if the default penalties were set to a level 
other than the three that correspond to the three equilibria. In Treatment 3 we set μ1 = μ2 = 1 
to explore this question. This game has a unique equilibrium which coincides with the joint 
maximum earnings. To ensure comparability with T2 we conducted this treatment once with 
holdings of goods and money carried over from one period to the next (two runs with the 
same subjects, T3), and once with holdings of goods and money re-initialized (one run, T3-
R).  
Figure 10 presents the development of holdings of goods over time in the two runs of 
T3. Both runs are quite similar and end in the vicinity of the unique equilibrium (joint 
maximum). Final holdings of goods are not significantly different from the holdings in the 
joint maximum in both runs (Mann-Whitney U-test, p > 0.1 in both runs, N=10), and 
Conjecture 6 is not rejected.  
(Insert Figure 10 about here) 
This is corroborated by the run we conducted with re-initialization, presented in 
Figure 11. On the left panel we see that the average final holdings of traders are in the 
vicinity of the unique equilibrium, though they never hit it perfectly. The right panel shows 
that efficiency increases over time (it is high in the first period, lower in the next two, and 
increases steadily from period 3 to the end). Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  24
 (Insert Figure 11 about here) 
  Equilibrium prediction is that the final net money holdings will be -2.3 for traders 
endowed with 40/0 and +2.3 for traders endowed with 0/50 of goods A/B. In the two runs of 
T3 average final money holdings turn out to be -3.9 and +3.9 for traders endowed with 40/0 
and 0/50, respectively (in T3-R final money holdings are -1.4 and +1.4, respectively). Results 
are consistent with the equilibrium predictions.  
As in Treatment 1 trading volume in T3 drops rapidly (see left panel of Figure 12) 
and efficiency rises over time (right panel of Figure 12). Again we see that efficiency and 
trading volume paths are slightly lower in the first few periods of the second run, and the 
second run lasts longer (11 vs. 8 periods in the first run) and ends with (insignificantly) 
higher efficiency. These facts are all comparable to in the results of T1. 
(Insert Figures 12 about here) 
4.4. A Summary of Results  
Conjecture 1   Confirmed. The process does not converge to an equilibrium.  
Conjecture 2   Rejected. While in Treatment 1 most paths end closer to the middle CE than to 
any other equilibrium even the middle equilibrium does not serve as a strong 
point of attraction.  
Conjecture 3   Confirmed. In Treatment 1 the choice of the money does not (statistically 
significantly) influence the outcome (efficiency or distribution of goods).  
Conjecture 4   Weakly confirmed. In Treatment 2 the system converges and can be made to 
converge to any of the three equilibria through the selection of the value of μ 
and initial endowment of money. Convergence to the “outer” equilibria takes 
longer than to the middle equilibrium.  Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  25
Conjecture 5   Rejected . Net money holdings differ from the equilibrium level of zero. 
Conjecture 6   Confirmed. The unique equilibrium is approached in Treatment 3. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the role of salvage value/default penalty of a fiat money in 
selection from a multiplicity of equilibria. In the laboratory markets reported here two goods 
were traded for each other (in Treatment 1) or for a money (in Treatments 2 and 3). 
Treatment 1 corroborated the conjecture that, in presence of three equilibria, the outcomes of 
the economy are noisy, lie somewhere in the middle of the range of the three equilibria, and 
do not converge to the close proximity of any of them. It also confirmed that when there are 
only two commodities with identical features in an economy, it makes no difference which 
one is chosen to serve as the numeraire (the commodity that serves as the money is used to 
bid in the market to buy the other good). 
Treatment 1 having established empirical support for the theoretical indeterminacy, 
Treatments 2 and 3 were designed to test the main hypothesis: salvage value/default penalty 
of a fiat money can be chosen to achieve any of the given equilibria of the economy, or more 
generally, any desired point on the contract curve. Thus the central experimental task is to 
examine the suggestion from theory that the institutional arrangements in a society provide 
the means to resolve the possibility of multiple equilibria in an economy. Results from 
Treatment 2, where three different default penalties were chosen, show that the economies  
approached the respective equilibria. There is empirical support for the attitudes of 
macroeconomists who do not regard the non-uniqueness of competitive equilibria as a major 
applied problem. A society implicitly solves the uniqueness problem in the guidance of a 
competitive economy by the selection of default penalties that link the value of money Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  26
directly to the preferences of individuals. The need for society to add the institutional details 
and extra parameters is forced by the need to specify how to handle all outcomes from a 
dynamic process. 
 Treatment 3 demonstrated that by proper selection of a default penalty any desired 
equilibrium can be selected from the multiple equilibria present. However, we stress that 
although a societal selection of the extra parameters is sufficient to obtain a unique 
equilibrium, unless the parameters coincide with the values of the Lagrangian variables at an 
equilibrium of a static exchange economy, the static equilibrium solution to the new game 
will not coincide with any of these equilibria.
19 
Summarizing, the first treatment indicated that none of the three equilibria provided 
much predictive power. Treatment 2 showed how a pair of socially engineered parameters 
could serve to select any of the equilibria, but this requires a “fine tuning” of the equilibrium 
values and detailed knowledge of the preferences and parameters of the economy. In a 
society with dispersed knowledge and perennial political and bureaucratic battles, neither 
such knowledge nor the fine tuning seems feasible. Treatment 3 investigated what happens if 
the marginal values of money fixed by the penalties do not coincide with the values at the 
three CEs. A different unique equilibrium point is predicted by the theory and reflected in the 
results from the lab.  
                                                 
19 We expect that if other penalties are selected the players will tend towards the equilibrium which will be fully 
three dimensional as the net trade will not balance to zero, but will involve a transfer of money between the 
agents.  In order to show this we would need a three dimensional diagram. A more detailed discussion of this 
point is in Qin and Shubik (2008). Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  27
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Figure 1: An Exchange Economy with Two Goods and Three Competitive Equilibria 
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Figure 2: Holdings of Goods A and B in the Four Runs of Treatment 1a 
 (with Good A as the Numeraire) 
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Figure 3: Holdings of Goods A and B in the Four Runs of Treatment 1b 
(with Good B as the Numeraire) 
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Figure 4: Time Series of Cumulative Trading Volume (Top Panels) and Efficiency 
(Bottom Panels) per Period in Treatment 1. T1a is presented on the left side, while T1b 
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Figure 5: Individual and Average Holdings of Goods A and B in Treatment 2  
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Holdings of goods A and B in Run 1 of T2c
 
 
Figure 6: Time Series of Cumulative Trading Volume in Treatment 2. T2a is presented 
on the left side, T2b in the center, and T2c on the right.  
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Figure 8: Time Series of Efficiency in Treatment 2-R (with holdings reinitialized) 
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Figure 9: Development of Average Net Money Holdings for Subjects endowed with 
















































































































































Holdings of goods A and B in Run 2 of T3
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Figure 11: Holdings of goods A and B (Left Panel) and Efficiency (Right Panel) per 
Period in Treatment 3-R. 
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Figure 12: Time Series of Trading Volume (Left Panel) and Efficiency (Right Panel) per 
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Appendix A: Instructions for Treatment 1 
 
General 
This is an experiment in market decision making. If you follow these instructions carefully 
and make good decisions, you will earn more money, which will be paid to you at the end of 
the experiment. 
   This experiment consists of one or more sessions of multiple periods and has 10 
participants. At the beginning of each session of the experiment, each of the five participants 
will receive 40 units of good A, and each of the other five will receive 50 units of good B. 
You will then have the opportunity to trade these goods for up to 20 periods. If the level of 
trading activity becomes low (less than 0.2 units of either A or B) the session will be 
terminated earlier. After one session is terminated, it may be followed by another session. 
Each participant is free to sell any or all the goods he/she owns for units of the other 
good.  Holdings of A and B are carried over from the end of one period to the beginning of 
the next period, so you can adjust your holdings in each period. Holdings are not carried over 
from the end of one session to the beginning of the next. You can only sell the good you were 
initially endowed with and you can only buy the other good.  
During each period we shall conduct a market in which the price per unit of B 
expressed in units of A will be determined. Good A will be used as “accounting unit” 
(money, gold) to calculate prices, i.e. prices of B will be expressed in units of A. All units of 
A and B which have been put up for sale will be exchanged at this price. The following 
paragraphs describe how the price per unit of A and B will be determined.  
 In each period, you are asked to enter the units of your endowed good (A or B) that you are 
willing to exchange for units of the other good (see the center of Screen 1). The number of 
units you offer cannot exceed your current holdings of that good.  
The computer will calculate the sum of the amounts of good A offered by all participants (= 
SumA). It will also calculate the total number of units of B offered for sale (SumB), and 
determine the unit price of B expressed in units of A, PB = SumA/SumB. 
If you offered bA units of A for sale, you will get bA/PB units of good B. If you offered bB 
units of B for sale, you will get bB*PB units of good A.  
 
Screen 1: trading screen for a trader endowed with good B Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  37
 
 
At the end of each period (after trading) the points you would earn for the goods you own are 
calculated. Specifically traders initially endowed with A earn: 
Points = A + 100 * (1-e
(-B/10)) 
And traders endowed with B earn  
Points = B + 110 * (1-e
(-A/10)) 
 
Example 1: If you were endowed with A and have 30 units of A and 15 units of B after 
trading you earn  
30 + 100* (1-e
(-15/10)) = 110 points.  
Example 2: If you were endowed with B and have 10 units of A and 25 units of B after 
trading you earn  
25 + 110* (1-e
(-10/10)) = 94.5 points. 
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Information on total bids 
and offers in the market 






Earnings this period 
– this amount divided 




  Screen 2 shows an example of calculations for Period 2. There are 10 participants in 
the market, and half of them started with 40 units each of A, the other half with 50 units each 







The earnings of only the last period of each session (shown in the last row of the last column 
in the lower part of Screen 2) will determine the dollars you earn. Your points in the last 
period of each session will be added up and divided by 12 to determine the dollars you earn.  
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How to calculate the points you earn: 
The points earned each period by those initially endowed with good A are calculated as: 
Points = A + 100 * (1-e
(-B/10)) 
And the points earned each period by those initially endowed with good B are calculated as: 
Points = B + 110 * (1-e
(-A/10)) 
The following tables may be useful to understand this relationship. They show the points 
resulting from different combinations of goods A and B.  
 
Table for those initially endowed with A: 
  Units of good A you hold at the end of a period 
  0  5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
0  0.0  5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 
5  39.3 44.3 49.3 54.3 59.3 64.3 69.3 74.3 79.3 84.3 89.3 
10  63.2 68.2 73.2 78.2 83.2 88.2 93.2 98.2  103.2  108.2  113.2 
15  77.7  82.7  87.7  92.7  97.7 102.7 107.7 112.7 117.7 122.7 127.7 
20  86.5  91.5  96.5 101.5 106.5 111.5 116.5 121.5 126.5 131.5 136.5 
25  91.8  96.8 101.8 106.8 111.8 116.8 121.8 126.8 131.8 136.8 141.8 
30  95.0 100.0 105.0 110.0 115.0 120.0 125.0 130.0 135.0 140.0 145.0 
35  97.0 102.0 107.0 112.0 117.0 122.0 127.0 132.0 137.0 142.0 147.0 
40  98.2 103.2 108.2 113.2 118.2 123.2 128.2 133.2 138.2 143.2 148.2 






50  99.3 104.3 109.3 114.3 119.3 124.3 129.3 134.3 139.3 144.3 149.3 
 
Table for those initially endowed with B: 
  Units of good A you hold at the end of a period 
  0  5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
0  0.0 43.3 69.5 85.5 95.1 101.0 104.5 106.7 108.0 108.8 109.3
5  5.0 48.3 74.5 90.5 100.1 106.0 109.5 111.7 113.0 113.8 114.3
10  10.0 53.3 79.5 95.5 105.1 111.0 114.5 116.7 118.0 118.8 119.3
15  15.0 58.3 84.5  100.5 110.1 116.0 119.5 121.7 123.0 123.8 124.3
20  20.0 63.3 89.5  105.5 115.1 121.0 124.5 126.7 128.0 128.8 129.3
25  25.0 68.3 94.5  110.5 120.1 126.0 129.5 131.7 133.0 133.8 134.3
30  30.0 73.3 99.5  115.5 125.1 131.0 134.5 136.7 138.0 138.8 139.3
35  35.0  78.3 104.5 120.5 130.1 136.0 139.5 141.7 143.0 143.8 144.3
40  40.0  83.3 109.5 125.5 135.1 141.0 144.5 146.7 148.0 148.8 149.3






50  50.0  93.3 119.5 135.5 145.1 151.0 154.5 156.7 158.0 158.8 159.3Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  40
Appendix B: Instructions for Treatments 2-R and 3-R (only μ varied) 
 
General 
This is an experiment in market decision making. If you follow these instructions 
carefully and make good decisions, you will earn more money, which will be paid to you at 
the end of the session. 
  This session consists of several periods and has 10 participants. At the beginning of 
each period, each of the five participants will receive 40 units of good A, and each of the 
other five will receive 50 units of good B. In addition each participant will receive 100 units 
of money at the start of each period. In each of some 10 to 20 period you will have the 
opportunity to offer your goods for sale and to buy the other goods.  
Each participant is free to offer for sale any part or all the goods he/she owns each 
period. You earn points for your holdings of good and money at the end of each period.  
Holdings of goods and money are not carried over from period to period; you start each 
period with 100 units of money and either 40 units of A or 50 units of B.  
During each period we conduct a market in which the price per unit of A and B will 
be determined. All units of A and B put up for sale will be sold at their respective price, and 
you can buy units of A and B at the same price. The following paragraphs describe how the 
price per unit of A and B will be determined.  
In each period, you are asked to enter the cash you are willing to pay to buy the good 
you do not own (say A), and the number of units of the good you own that you are willing to 
sell (say B) (see the center of Screen 1). The cash you bid to buy cannot exceed your 
money balance (100), and the units you offer to sell cannot exceed your holdings of that 
good (40 of A or 50 of B). You receive the income from the sale of any goods to be paid in 
money at the end of each period. 
The computer will calculate the sum of the amounts of good A offered by all 
participants (= SumA). It will also calculate the total number of units of money offered to buy 
the goods ($SumA) and determine the price of A expressed in terms of money,  
pA = $SumA/SumA. The same is done with good B. 
If you offer qA units of A for sale, you will get an income of qA*PA.  If you bid bA 
units of money to purchase A, you will get bA/PA units of good A.  Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  41
Screen 1: trading screen for a trader endowed with good B 
 
 
Both goods are perishable and must be either sold or consumed in the current period. The 
number of units of A and B you own at the end of the period, cA and cB (unsold units of 
owned good and purchased units of the other good) will be consumed and determine the 
number of points you earn for the period. Traders initially endowed with A earn: 
Points = (1/ μ) * (A + 100 * (1-e
(-B/10))) + NET MONEY 
COMMENT: μ = 1 in T2, 0.28 in T3a, 0.75 in T3b, and 5.07 in T3c. 
 
And traders endowed with B earn  
Points = B + 110 * (1-e
(-A/10)) + NET MONEY 
Example: If at the end of any period you are endowed with B and have 30 units of A and 15 
units of B you earn 15 + 110* (1-e^
(-30/10)) = 119.5 points.  
 Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  42
Cumulative earnings 
so far. This 
number/60 will be the 
US-$ you get 
Earnings for the 
current period 
Information on bids 
and transactions in 
good A 
Information on bids 




Your cash balance holdings will help determine the points you earn. At the end of 
each period the starting endowment of 100 units of money will be deducted from your final 
money holdings. The resulting net holdings (which may be negative) will be added to (or 
subtracted from) your total points earned.  
  Screen 2 shows an example of calculations for Period 2. There are 10 participants in 
the market, and half of them have 40 units of A, the other half 50 units of B. Here we see a 





















The earnings of each period are added up in the last column. At the end they will be 
converted into real Dollars at the rate of 60 points = 1 US$ and this amount will be paid out 
to you. Default Penalty as Selection Mechanism  43
How to calculate the points you earn (in Treatment T2c): 
The points those initially endowed with A earn each period are calculated as: 
Points = (A + 100 * (1-e^
(-B/10))) + Net Money 
And the points those initially endowed with B earn each period are calculated as: 
Points = 1/5.07 * (B + 110 * (1-e^
(-A/10)) + Net Money 
The following tables may be useful to understand this relationship. They show the resulting 
points from different combinations of goods A and B (assuming net money to be zero). 
 
Table for those initially endowed with A: 
  Units of good A you hold at the end of a period 
  0  5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0  0.0 5.0  10.0  15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0
5  39.3 44.3 49.3 54.3 59.3 64.3 69.3 74.3 79.3 84.3 89.3
10  63.2 68.2 73.2 78.2 83.2 88.2 93.2 98.2 103.2 108.2 113.2
15  77.7 82.7 87.7 92.7 97.7 102.7 107.7 112.7 117.7 122.7 127.7
20  86.5 91.5 96.5  101.5 106.5 111.5 116.5 121.5 126.5 131.5 136.5
25  91.8 96.8  101.8  106.8 111.8 116.8 121.8 126.8 131.8 136.8 141.8
30  95.0 100.0 105.0 110.0 115.0 120.0 125.0 130.0 135.0 140.0 145.0
35  97.0 102.0 107.0 112.0 117.0 122.0 127.0 132.0 137.0 142.0 147.0
40  98.2 103.2 108.2 113.2 118.2 123.2 128.2 133.2 138.2 143.2 148.2






50  99.3 104.3 109.3 114.3 119.3 124.3 129.3 134.3 139.3 144.3 149.3
 
Table for those initially endowed with B:  
  Units of good A you hold at the end of a period 
  0  5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0  0.0 8.5  13.7  16.9 18.8 19.9 20.6 21.0 21.3 21.5 21.6
5  1.0 9.5  14.7  17.8 19.7 20.9 21.6 22.0 22.3 22.4 22.5
10  2.0 10.5 15.7 18.8 20.7 21.9 22.6 23.0 23.3 23.4 23.5
15  3.0 11.5 16.7 19.8 21.7 22.9 23.6 24.0 24.3 24.4 24.5
20  3.9 12.5 17.7 20.8 22.7 23.9 24.6 25.0 25.2 25.4 25.5
25  4.9 13.5 18.6 21.8 23.7 24.8 25.5 26.0 26.2 26.4 26.5
30  5.9 14.5 19.6 22.8 24.7 25.8 26.5 27.0 27.2 27.4 27.5
35  6.9 15.4 20.6 23.8 25.7 26.8 27.5 27.9 28.2 28.4 28.5
40  7.9 16.4 21.6 24.7 26.6 27.8 28.5 28.9 29.2 29.3 29.4






50  9.9 18.4 23.6 26.7 28.6 29.8 30.5 30.9 31.2 31.3 31.4
 
 